“Dorothy Thompson, who judged Hitler a man of ‘startling insignificance’ in 1928, realized her mistake by mid-decade when she, like Mowrer, began raising the alarm. ‘No people ever recognize their dictator in advance,’ she reflected in 1935. ‘He never stands for election on the platform of dictatorship. He always represents himself as the instrument [of] the Incorporated National Will.” Applying the lesson to the U.S., she wrote, ‘When our dictator turns up you can depend on it that he will be one of the boys, and he will stand for everything traditionally American.’”
This is the third posting in a six part series evaluating Carl H. Esbeck’s “Protestant Dissent and the Virginia Disestablishment 1776-1786.” For the first two posts in the series click on the following links: Intro and Part I.
After years of abuse and second class citizenship, the Declaration of Rights (DOR) gave the religious dissenters hope that they would finally become equal citizens. Standing in the way of this equality was the established Church of England, whose privileges could not be reconciled with the DOR. To remedy this situation, the dissenters sent a series of petitions to the newly created General Assembly in the fall of 1776. These petitions give us the opportunity to test Esbeck’s volunatryism principle to see how compatible it is with the dissenters’ sentiments.
Dissenting Petitions (1776): Exemplars of Voluntaryism?
As previously explained, Esbeck’s principle of voluntaryism included three related claims: the issue of free exercise of religion was separate from calls for disestablishment; questions about establishments were about the relationship between two centers of power (organized religion and government), not individual rights; and the goal was to limit government intervention in organized religion, but not the other way around. The dissenters pursued this arrangement, according to Esbeck, because they wanted “to protect the church from undue control by the government.” (103) (italics mine) As an archetype of the dissenting position, Esbeck offers the petition from the Hanover Presbytery – thus one would expect this petition to be an unambiguous representation of voluntaryism.
The Hanover petition was presented to the House of Delegates on October 24. An examination of the document reveals that its author, most likely the Presbytery clerk Caleb Wallace, chose to write the document in the language of the Enlightenment. Even the appeal to “the great Sovereign of the Universe” at the end of the document is a reflection of inclusive Enlightenment language of the Deists.
At the time, the Hanover Presbytery boasted a significant number of graduates of the College of New Jersey (Princeton), including Wallace. At that time, the college was a beacon of Enlightenment thought under the leadership of the Scottish Presbyterian minister John Witherspoon. Also among its most distinguished graduates was James Madison, who attended at the same time, but in different cohorts, as many of the Hanover Presbyterians. (1) Imbued with the same zeal for religious liberty and as steeped in the new Enlightenment learning as was Madison, Wallace would have been the ideal candidate to write the document. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the Hanover petition reads more like the work of an Enlightenment rationalist, than the work of a deeply pious minister, which Wallace certainly was. Given our current politics we tend to think of these two things as incompatible, but in late eighteenth-century America, Enlightenment rationality and religious piety were frequent companions within many dissenting communities. This should not be surprising given the fact that Enlightenment itself was largely the product of the fight waged by religious dissenters against intolerant governments that sought to impose religious uniformity upon them.
Turning to the petition Esbeck’s argument begins to break down from the start. The opening paragraph, which sets up their argument against religious establishments, makes a strong appeal to individual rights. Speaking for all “dissenters from the church of England [increasingly called the Protestant Episcopal Church],” the petitioners expressed gratitude for the Declaration of Rights (DOR), which they referred to “as the magna charta of our commonwealth.” This DOR was what they “rely[ed] upon” to secure their “free exercise of religion according to the dictates of our consciences.” (2) (italics in original) Now that they had secured these equal rights, they requested to be freed from “the religious grievances under which [they] have hitherto laboured.” Such a prominent place given to this review of their rights highlights their significance. Undermining Esbeck’s first two points separating rights from requests to disestablish religion, this paragraph alone illustrates the essential link between individual rights and disestablishment in the dissenters’ view.
This point is reinforced in the second paragraph, where they called attention to the fact that they had been subjected to “invidious, and disadvantageous restrictions” in support of “an establishment, from which their consciences and principles oblige them to dissent: all of which are confessedly so many violations of their natural rights; and in their consequences, a restraint upon freedom of inquiry, and private judgement.” (italics mine) In consequence, they expressed the hope that the legislature would “cheerfully concur in removing every species of religious, as well as civil bondage.” This request goes beyond simply a demand for the disestablishment of the Episcopal Church. They wanted an end to all privileges made on the basis of religious beliefs. To make their point they declared that they were opposed to even the establishment of Christianity since “there is no argument in favour of establishing the Christian religion, but what may be pleaded, with equal propriety, for establishing the tenets of Mahomed by those who believe the Alcoran; or if this be not true, it is at least impossible for the magistrate to adjudge the right of preference among the various sects that profess the Christian faith, without erecting a chair of infallibility, which would lead us back to the church of Rome.” This passage demonstrates the centrality of equal rights in their conception of church-state relations. They rejected even a privileging of Christianity because it violated the principle of equality. It also illustrates a concern beyond simply the fear of government intervention in “organized religion.” They saw the threat of tyranny in allowing the state to make decisions concerning what is, or is not, acceptable religious beliefs and/or practices.
This point is further clarified later, when they rejected an establishment of their own religion because this “would be giving exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges to one set (or sect) of men, without any special public services to the common reproach and injury of every other denomination.” Here the dissenters are referencing Article 4 of the DOR, which reads: “That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services…” (3) It is important to note that they are referring to the individuals within these “sets of men,” not organized religion, as is indicated by their statement that “all partial and invidious distinctions will be abolished” then “every one [will] be left to stand or fall according to merit, which can never be the case, so long as any one denomination is established in preference to others.” (italics mine)
The extent of the Presbyterians’ goals concerning the disestablishment of religion is explicitly stated. They insisted that “the only proper objects of civil government, are the happiness and protection of men in the present state of existence; the security of the life, liberty and property of the citizens; and to restrain the vicious and encourage the virtuous by wholesome laws, equally extending to every individual.” The extent of their desire to disestablishment religion goes far beyond the more limited goals of voluntaryism, which apply only to organized religion.
A further blow to Esbeck’s version of events is the fact that there is no mention of limiting the state to protect “organized religion” anywhere in the petition. This rights-centric petition bears little resemblance to the church-focused one described by Esbeck. In addition, there is nothing in this petition, even on a generous reading, that indicates that the primary motive behind their anti-establishment campaign was to protect “the church.” On the contrary, their message was clear, they wanted an end to all establishments on the grounds that these violated their individual rights and that the solution was to limit the state from intervening in matters of religion with the exception of protecting them in their rights. And “left in the quiet possession of their unalienable rights and privileges” Christianity would flourish in greater purity. This benefit to religion was a consequence of protecting rights and of putting religion outside the bounds of government jurisdiction.
There is no reconciling the Hanover petition with Esbeck’s voluntaryism principle. Rather than seeking to protect “the church” the Presbyterians were seeking to end all privileges and/or burdens on the basis of religious beliefs because these were “so many violations of their natural rights.” Rights were inextricably linked to their desire to separate church (religion) and state, and cannot be dismissed as extraneous flourishes in an otherwise church-focused petition. In addition, there is no mention of preventing the state from intervening in organized religion so that religion can be free to prevent state tyranny. To the dissenters, the source of tyranny was the alliance between church and state (i.e. establishments of religion), and church intervention in state affairs was just as much anathema to them as state intervention in religion. This will become increasingly clear as the campaign against religious establishments progresses.
Looking at the other petitions there is one, submitted by the German Congregation of Culpepper County, that somewhat resembles the dissenters of Esbeck’s imagination. Unlike the other dissenters, this congregation expressed support for the established Church and sought more limited goals: to be relieved from taxes in support of the establishment and to obtain full privileges for their ministers. In other words, they were not asking for full equality as citizens, they were seeking a more generous system of toleration for themselves. (4) This petition is interesting and partly conforms to Esbeck’s characterization of dissenting goals, but as an outlier from a small group it tells us little about the broader dissenting movement.
There is another petition that expresses a concern for “several Churches,” and is therefore a potential representative of Esbeck’s voluntaryism. But rather than supporting Esbeck’s contention that they were primarily concerned about “the church,” the dissenters were making a minor point in a much longer complaint that focused on the unjust privileges of the established Church. They made clear in their petition that any unjust privileging based on religious differences was in violation of their rights. Therefore, they hoped that the new government “would secure just & equal Rights to the Subjects.” (5) This same sentiment was expressed in the separate but almost identical petition from Albemarle, Amherst, and Buckingham counties. (6)
Similarly, the petitioners from the heavily Presbyterian Prince Edward County emphasized individual rights. These petitioners praised “the last article of the Bill of Rights [Art. 16] as the rising sun of Religious liberty,” which they believed was meant “to relieve them from a long night of Ecclesiastical bondage.” Thus, they requested that the House “complete what is so nobly begun; that is, to raise Religious as well as Civil liberty to the zenith of glory.” To achieve this, they believed that “all Church establishments” should be pulled down, as well as ALL burdens “upon conscious and private judgment” so that “each Individual” could “rise or sink according to his merit.” (7) (italics mine) This petition unequivocally demonstrates the connection between rights and disestablishment, and nowhere do they indicate that their goal was to protect the church from the state.
A petition organized by the Baptists received 10,000 signatures, an impressive number for the time. The petition notified the House that their hopes had “been raised and confirmed by the Declaration of Rights” in regards “to equal Liberty. EQUAL LIBERTY!” which was the “Birthright of every good member of society.” The explicit reference to the equality of “every good member of society” leaves no doubt that it was the equality of individuals, not of religious societies, that they were seeking. They concluded with a request that the establishment “as well as every other yoke, may be broken, and the oppressed may go free.” In other words, these petitioners sought to end all privileges based on religious beliefs, and they insisted that the only proper role for government in religious matters was “to support them in their just Rights and equal privileges.” (8)
On October 25, two petitions from Berkeley County informed the House of Delegates that their hopes had “been raised & confirmed by the Declaration of your Honourable House in the last Article of rights [article 16].” Following the pattern of the other petitions, they pronounced that the “Ecclesiastical Establishment” was “a grievous Burden & inconsistent with the rights of humanity either Civil or religious.” They believed that “the rights of human Nature (& religious Liberty in its fullest extent is one of these) …should have every protection & Ground of Security which Laws & the Policy of free States can give them.” In consequence, they demanded “that No Laws which are indefensible & incompatible with the rights of Conscience should be Suffered to remain unrepealed.” (italics mine) This would include any laws that privileged a particular religion (including a particular religious belief or practice), or religious denomination. In line with this they also insisted that “the rights of human Nature (& religious Liberty in its fullest extent is one of these) …should have every protection & Ground of Security which Laws & the Policy of free States can give them.” (9)
Similarly, the petitioners from Augusta County wanted all “unequal Burthen[s]” based on religious beliefs to be abolished. They believed that these “Burthens[s]” were “Inconsistent with Justice, & with that Virtuous Civil as well as religious Liberty that every Christian would wish to enjoy for Himself and that ought to be the portion of Every Good member of Society.” (10) While these petitioners seemed to believe that all members of society were Christians, which was mostly true at that time, they also indicated that “Every Good member of Society” should receive the same treatment, which would presumably include non-Christians. Consistent with a more inclusive goal they claimed that they were “Struggling in Defence of the Common Rights of Mankind.” Like other dissenters, these petitioners believed that their equal rights as citizens were incompatible with any religious establishments because these unjustly privileged some above others.
These petitions are hard to square with Esbeck’s characterization of the dissenters’ views. The main focus in almost all of these petitions was on securing rights, which in their view meant that all religious establishments must be torn down. This is the link that Esbeck denies existed, but it is undeniable if we are to take the dissenters at their word. References to “the church” or organized religion were rare, and when they did appear they were not central to the main message. It was not that they were not concerned about their own churches, it was rather that they saw that the best way to protect religion, and their own church, was by securing their individual rights. This in turn meant that government must get out of the business of religion altogether, as they repeatedly insisted. “[I]f mankind were left in the quiet possession of their unalienable rights and privileges, Christianity, as in the days of the Apostles; would continue to prevail and flourish in the greatest purity, by its own native excellence, and under the all disposing providence of God [not the state].” By ignoring the consistent and frequent references to individual rights Esbeck has distorted the dissenting view of religious liberty, and has falsely championed them as disciples of an accommodationist view of church-state relations.
The Bill for Dissenters (1776)
In response to the petitions the legislature attempted to placate the dissenters. Jefferson, back from his stint at the Continental Congress, where he had written the Declaration of Independence, led the fight for religious liberty in Virginia as a representative in the House of Delegates. As a member of the Committee for Religion (COR), which had been given the task of dealing with the petitions, he sought to go all the way in fulfilling the dissenters’ plea to sever the ties between religion and government in Virginia. To his dismay, the conservative Episcopalians, who dominated the legislature, obstructed his efforts. He later described these events as “the severest contests in which I have ever been engaged.” (11) The fights over establishment of religion in 1776 are revealing. In the end, the established Church would remain intact, but the dissenters would get some relief from their burdens. In addition, the bill for dissenters, which passed during the fall session, shifted the central issue of the debate towards a fight over general assessments (taxes supporting all denominations).
Also on the COR was the budding statesman James Madison, whose famous friendship with Jefferson had yet to develop. Even though Madison’s victory at the Convention set the stage for the dissenters’ campaign against religious establishments, his role in the House was overshadowed by his already distinguished colleague. As members of the Anglican Church these rationalists and their supporters led the dissenters cause from within the seat of power. As unlikely as this alliance between pious dissenters and rationalists may seem they shared similar goals, even if their motives were different, when it came to religious liberty. How closely these two groups worked together is unknown, but the frequent lobbying at the legislature by the dissenters would have brought them into frequent contact. This alliance was also aided by Madison’s outspoken objections to the persecution of dissenters, as well as his acquaintanceship with some members of the Hanover Presbytery, whom he knew from his time at the College of New Jersey. (12) After a protracted battle these allies eventually succeeded in bringing down establishments of religion in Virginia, but unbeknownst to them the battle in 1776 was just the beginning of a very long and taxing war between two competing visions of religious liberty.
As a member of the COR Jefferson drafted a far-reaching bill (“Resolutions for Disestablishing the Church of England and for Repealing Laws Interfering with Freedom of Worship”) to satisfy the requests from the dissenters. This bill would not only have dismantled the established Church and banned religious assessments, it also would have eliminated all laws on the subject of religion, including the total banishment of laws constraining free inquiry on the subject of religion. The extent of his separationist intent can be seen in this fragment of his draft calling for “<totally and eternally restraining the civil magistrate from all pretentions of interposing his authority or exercise in matters of religion>.” (13) Jefferson’s core views on religious liberty are already visible in this early work on the subject, which are best summarized by his famous metaphor (“a wall of separation between church and state”).
Thanks to conservative intransigence, the final version of the bill reflected more modest concessions for dissenters, as indicated by the new title: For exempting the different societies of dissenters from contributing to the support and maintenance of the church as by law established. This legislative act gave dissenters relief from paying taxes in support of religion but other burdens remained, including the existence of the established Church. It also called for the repeal of all acts or statutes “of England or of Great Britain” that “renders criminal the maintaining any opinions in matters of religion,” attendance at church, or the exercise of religion. (14) Virginia laws that had similar effects, which Jefferson also desired to either eliminate or severely weaken, were left intact.
The conservatives also managed to sneak in a suggestion for “a general assessment” to support “ministers and teachers of the gospel who are of different persuasions and denominations.” The implementation of any such assessment, according to the act, had been postponed until after “the opinions of the country in general may be better known.” (15) Understanding that the privileged status of the Anglican Church would eventually crumble under the weight of the republican principles of equality and freedom, the conservatives sought to establish a broader Christian establishment as a way to preserve some kind of establishment. They probably believed that this broader establishment would placate the dissenters since it would benefit them just as much as the Episcopal Church. If this was the case, they were mistaken, which shows that they fundamentally misunderstood the dissenters’ position.
The origins of the proposal are unknown but there is no doubt that Jefferson was adamantly opposed. In his Autobiography, Jefferson claimed that his camp was able only to hold off the creation of an actual assessment bill until 1779, which will be the subject of the next post. (16)
In the meantime, the bill “for dissenters” passed on December 9. While happy to be freed from the burden of taxes in support of religion, the dissenters were incensed by the suggestion of a religious assessment, and in response the Baptists and Presbyterians submitted another round of petitions. The focus of these petitions was slightly different from their earlier ones since they took aim at the general assessment, but the same basic principles of religious liberty can be seen in their opposition to the proposed general assessment.
The Hanover Presbyterians opened their petition declaring their hope that “their fellow subjects” would join them “to repel the assaults of tyranny and to maintain their common rights.” (17) They gave a “hearty approbation” to the DOR as the document that protected these rights. They also applauded the act “for dissenters,” which they saw as “declaring that equal liberty, as well religious as civil, shall be universally extended to the good people of this country.” (italics mine) Once again rights are front and center in their petition.
Angered by the suggestion for a general assessment, they felt compelled to repeat their previous request: “That dissenters of every denomination may be exempted from all taxes for the support of any church whatsoever, further than what may be agreeable to the private choice or voluntary obligation of every individual; while the civil magistrates no other wise interfere, than to protect them all in the full and free exercise of their several modes of worship.” (italics mine) Here we can clearly see their reasoning against this establishment of religion. The DOR promised them equal rights as individuals, including their religious rights that left them free to make their own choices concerning religion, which were threatened by the assessment scheme. To rectify this situation and to secure their rights they demanded that the government have no jurisdiction in matters of religion except to protect them in their “full and free exercise of their several modes of worship.” This is obviously a much broader prohibition against government involvement in religious affairs than simply the limit concerning “organized religion” proposed by Esbeck.
The opening paragraph ends with the reference to religious conscience. Here the Presbyterians, following the reasoning in Art. 16, argued “that the duty which we owe our Creator, and the manner of discharging it, can only be directed by reason and conviction, and is no where cognizable but at the tribunal of the universal Judge.” From here it follows that “all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience.” In other words, religion is a matter between individuals and their God, and therefore not subject to government intervention. This reasoning is rooted in the historical legacy of Western Christendom in which states, with the prompting of the Church, had designated themselves as responsible for the salvation of their subjects. (18) Religious dissenters in post-Reformation Europe challenged this tradition by maintaining that they alone were responsible for their own salvation. Although not the originator of this argument, John Locke used this same line of thought in his well-known defense of toleration: “How great soever, in fine, may be the pretence of good-will and charity, and concern for the salvation of men’s souls, men cannot be forced to be saved whether they will or no. And therefore, when all is done, they must be left to their own consciences.” (19) We can see the same reasoning in the Hanover petition: “that to judge for ourselves, and to engage in the exercise of religion agreeable to the dictates of consciences is an unalienable right, which upon the principles that the gospel was first propagated…can never be transferred to another [i.e. the state].” This is the premise upon which the case against state intervention in religious affairs is built. Appeals to the rights of conscience cannot be dismissed as simply a matter of the free exercise of religion, and having nothing to do with demands to disestablish religion.
Unlike their previous petition, there is some indication that concern for “the church” motivated the Presbyterians to object to the proposed assessment. In laying out their objections, the Presbyterians claimed that the assessment would be “an injury to the society to which we belong.” On its own this seems to verify Esbeck’s claim, but examined in context this contention falls apart. This statement was part of an argument against the claim that assessments were needed to prop up religion. To counter their opponent’s argument, they denied that “the church of Christ” needed support from the state. Rather, they insisted that this support would “be an injury to the society to which we belong.” As a specific response to a specific argument, it does not support Esbeck’s contention that it was only organized religion which the dissenters were concerned about and wanted to put outside the bounds of government control. In fact, the Hanover Presbyterians followed the above argument with the conclusion that “the kingdom of Christ, and the concerns of religion, are beyond the limits of civil control.” (italics mine) And to be clear, they explained that for this reason they rejected “any emoluments [for themselves] from human establishments for the support of the gospel.”
There is an additional section that Esbeck has seized upon to support his claim that “organized religion” is the core concern of the dissenters. In this section, the Presbyterians pointed out that if the state had “any rightful authority over the ministers of the gospel in the exercise of their sacred office,” then they could decide “who shall preach, what they shall preach; or to impose any regulations and restrictions upon religious societies that they may judge expedient.” This particular argument was aimed at the proposed general assessment which would have given support directly to “ministers and teachers of the gospel who are of different persuasions and denominations.” While the dissenters expressed concern for the freedom of preachers of the gospel and religious societies, their goals were much broader than this specific complaint against the assessment. It does not change the fact that they also twice stated that “religion” should be completely outside the bounds of control by the civil government. In addition, they concluded their petition by twice stating that “any assessment for religious purposes” was “subversive of religious liberty.” (italics mine) On both points (they wanted the government limited only in matters of “organized religion” and that they were concerned only about harm to “the Presbyterian Church”) Esbeck is wrong.
What about the Baptists? The Baptists, like the Presbyterians, began their complaint with rights. They informed the legislature “that preachers should be supported only by voluntary contributions from the people, and that a general assessment (however harmless, yea useful some may conceive it to be) is pregnant with various Evils destructive to the Rights and Privileges of religious Society.” (20) Note that the rights they referred to were not the rights of religious societies but “religious Society” (i.e. society). The danger they saw was a danger not just to the church per se, but to their rights as individuals, as indicated by their reference to the “last article of the bill of rights” (Art. 16). Rather than being coerced by the state, they believed that contributions to religion should be given on the basis of “the freedom of their own will” (a freedom that belongs to individuals).
Echoing the Presbyterians, the Baptists asserted that the connection with the state set up by the assessment would have a corrupting effect on the clergy. It was obvious to them that “those whom the State employs in its Service, it has a Right to regulate and dictate to; it may judge and determine who shall preach; when and where they shall preach; and what they must preach.” They reminded the legislature that it had no business intervening in matters of religion. To them, the proposed assessment was an example of “civil Rulers go[ing] so far out of their Sphere as to take the Care and Management of religious Affairs upon them!” (italics in original) To the Baptists, it was “religious Affairs,” not organized religion, that was out of bounds for government intervention. This petition, like the others, grounded its claims against establishments on individual rights and individual choice.
It is already clear that Esbeck’s voluntaryism with its focus on protecting organized religion is not representative of the dissenters’ own views. Only by ignoring much of what the dissenters said can the principle of voluntaryism be claimed to represent their views on the relationship between church and state. In reality, the dissenters’ vision of religious freedom was much broader, and rights-based. And they consistently insisted that the government had no business interfering in matters of religion except to protect them in their religious rights. This vision will become even clearer as we go through the remaining history of disestablishment.
Next we will turn to the events of 1779, when the battle for religious liberty ended in a stalemate after both sides failed in their attempt to implement new legislation. On one side, the conservatives attempted to pass an actual bill establishing a general assessment while, while at the other end of the spectrum, Jefferson attempted to pass his celebrated Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. This legislative clash of world views is revealing and will help us understand the dissenter/rationalist perspective.
- Thos. Cary Johnson, Virginia Presbyterianism and Religious Liberty in Colonial and Revolutionary Times (Richmond, 1907), 57-74.
- Hanover Presbytery Petition (October 24, 1776), Library of Virginia: Digital Collection (hereafter LOVD). (accessed 12/14/16).
- The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), The Founders’ Constitution (Volume 1, Chapter 1, Document 3) The University of Chicago Press (accessed 12/14/16).
- Petition of the German Congregation of Culpepper County (October 22, 1776) LOVD. (accessed 12/14/16)
- Petition from Albemarle and Amherst counties (November 1, 1776) LOVD. (accessed 12/14/16)
- Petitions from Albemarle, Amherst and Buckingham counties (two on October 22 and one on November 1) LOVD. (accessed 12/14/16)
- Prince Edward County Petition (October 11, 1776) LOVD. (accessed 12/14/16). And in the Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia (Richmond: Samuel shepherd & Co., 1828), 7. Hereafter cited as JHD. All dates for these petitions are from the dates they were submitted to the Assembly.
- “Ten-thousand name” petition by Dissenters (October 16, 1776) LOVD. (accessed 12/14/16).
- Berkeley County petition, Dissenters of Tuscarora Congregation (October 25, 1776) LOVD. (accessed 12/14/16) The Journal of the House of Delegates states that two petitions were presented on October 25 but only one petition appears in the LOVD collection. (26)
- Augusta County petition (November 9, 1776) LOVD. (accessed 12/14/16).
- Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, Founders Online.
- In a letter to William Bradford (January 24, 1774), Madison wrote in response to the persecution of some Baptist preachers: “That diabolical Hell conceived principle of persecution rages among some and to their eternal Infamy the Clergy can furnish their Quota of Imps for such business. This vexes me the most of any thing whatever. There are at this [time] in the adjacent County not less than 5 or 6 well meaning men in close Goal for publishing their religious Sentiments which in the main are very orthodox. I have neither patience to hear talk or think of any thing relative to this matter, for I have squabbled and scolded abused and ridiculed so long about it, to so little purpose that I am without common patience. So I leave you to pity me and pray for Liberty of Conscience to revive among us.” Founders Online.
- Thomas Jefferson, “Rough Draft of Jefferson’s Resolutions for Disestablishing the Church of England and for Repealing Laws Interfering with Freedom of Worship,” (written between October 11 and November 19, 1776) Founders Online.
- Journal of the House of Delegates of Virginia, 1776 (Richmond: Samuel Shepherd & Co., 1828), 63.
- William Waller Hening, ed. The Statutes at Large; being a Collection of all the Laws of Virginia, from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619. vol. IX. (Virginia: 1808), 165.
- Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, Founders Online.
- Petition of the Hanover Presbytery (June 3, 1777) LOVD.
- For example, many European states took steps to eradicate heresy, in part, because the Third Lateran Council (1179) threatened excommunication for those rulers who did not “extirpate” heresy. John Marshall, John Locke, Toleration and Early Enlightenment Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 216.
- John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, translated by William Popple (1689). See Google Books (p. 33)
- “The SENTIMENTS of THE BAPTISTS with regard to a GENERAL ASSESMENT,” Virginia Gazette (Dixon & Hunter), 28 March 1777, pp. 6-7. See the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation: Digital Library.